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THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF PRIVATE PAPERS:
FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT
CONSIDERATIONS
There is a recognizable factual distinction between the search and
seizure of private papers and the search and seizure of non-documen-
tary items.1 It is difficult, however, to decide when such a distinction
should assume constitutional dimensions. Specifically, are there circum-
stances under which private papers should be immune from search and
seizure? In a 1967 landmark case, Warden v. Hayden,2 the United
States Supreme Court raised doubts concerning the continued validity of
decades of settled law' on this important issue. Warden's reopening of
this problem aroused the curiosity of commentators,4 spurred new pol-
icy arguments in the American Law Institute,5 divided the lower federal
courts,6 and raised fundamental questions concerning the central
meaning7 of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. This Comment will
1. "Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property." En-
tick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765). "There is a marked difference
between private papers and other objects in terms of the underlying value the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect . . . . [P]rivate papers are almost inseparable from the
privacy and security of the individual." State v. Bisaccia, 213 A.2d 185, 191 (N.J.
1965).
2. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
3. The general categories were settled; their application, however, was a constant
source of confusion and criticism. See text accompanying notes 43-48 infra.
4. See, e.g., T. TAYLOR, Two STu~rEs IN CONSTITUTONAL INTERPRETATION 93-95,
101-03 (1969); 20 ALA. L. REV. 149 (1967); 32 ALBANY L. Rav. 229 (1967); 17
AM. U.L. Rav. 119 (1967); 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 122 (1968); 34 BROOKLYN L. RaV. 309
(1968); 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 213 (1967); 6 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 60 (1967); The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAv. L. Rnv. 69, 110, 112-17 (1967); 42 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rnv. 425 (1968); 46 Tut. L. RFv. 545 (1972).
5. Compare ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 210.3, Note
and Comment (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1972) with AL MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAiGN mNT PROCEDURE § 1.03(2), Note and Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1971) and ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRoCEDURE § 1.03(2), Note and
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970). See also 48 ALI PRocEEiNGs 426, 429-31
(1971); 47 ALI PROCEEDiNGS 59, 61-62, 74, 77-80, 82 (1970).
6. Compare Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971), with United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 984 (1971), and United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 887 (1972). Most of the other cases dealing with the issue since Warden
are collected in note 112 infra.
7. Cf. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sip. Or. REv. 191 (1964).
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explore the background leading to the present state of legal confusion,
assess recent trends in decisional law, discuss the relevant policy ar-
guments, and suggest a new approach regarding the search and seiz-
ure of private papers.
I. Tim BACKGROUND
An analysis of search and seizure involving private papers can prof-
itably begin with the "great case" of Boyd v. United States.' In Boyd
the District Attorney of the United States for the Southern District of New
York procured an order from a district judge demanding that defend-
ant Boyd produce an invoice for twenty-nine cases of plate glass pre-
viously imported into the country. 10 Boyd produced the invoice but
subsequently questioned the constitutionality of the order, claiming
the invoice was to be offered in evidence against him at trial.'1 Justice
Bradley, speaking for the Court, upheld Boyd's contention on both
Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds:
[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the
owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him
to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure
-and an unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.'
2
Justice Bradley reasoned:
[T]he "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a
man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is con-
demned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the
Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unrea-
sonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
8. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
147 (1925), referred to Boyd as "the leading case on the subject of search and
seizure." See also W. RiNG.EL, SEARcHES AND SEiZ=REs, ARRsm AND CONFESSIONS
§ 3.01 (1972) (describing Boyd as "the first case of any importance involving the
Fourth Amendment.").
9. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
10. Id. at 617-18.
11. Id. at 618. The invoice was subsequently used in evidence to establish the
quantity and value of plate glass contained in thirty-five other cases which the govern-
ment had seized. The government believed that Boyd, with intent to defraud the
government of revenue, had attempted to import the glass by fraudulent means.
12. Id. at 634-35.
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private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is sub-
stantially different from compelling him to be a witness against him-
self.
18
The Court recognized that the taking of papers by subpoena avoided
"certain aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, such as
forcible entry into a man's house and searching amongst his papers
.... ."4 Nevertheless, the use of a subpoena for such purposes was held
to be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution "in all
cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it . . . effects
the sole object and purpose of search and seizure."'15
Boyd thus stood for the proposition that papers in the possession of
an individual could not be the subject of a lawful search if the exclu-
sive justification for the search was the evidentiary value of such ma-
terials. The Court's resolution of the case reflected society's judgment
that the personal liberty of an individual was so important that it out-
weighed the interests of law enforcement in securing evidence. In-
deed, Boyd approvingly cited the language of the great 0 English land-
mark Entick v. Carrington:1
7
[T]here are some crimes, such, for instance, as murder, rape, robbery,
and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are
more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-search
in these cases to help forward the conviction. Whether this pro-
ceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or from a
consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the inno-
cent than useful to the public, I will not say. It is very certain that the
law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of
compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the
guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem, that search
for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then, too the in-
nocent would be confounded with the guilty' 3s
13. Id. at 633.
14. Id. at 622.
15. Id.
16. See R.F.V. HEuSTON, ESSAYS IN CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 35 (2d ed. 1964) (noting
that Entick is "'the case to take to a desert island'."). As might be expected, the
power of English authorities to search has been significantly broadened since Entick.
See generally R. ARGJUILE, CRIMINAL PROCEDmUR 38-40 (1969); D. FELLMAN, Th-
DEFENDANVS RIGHTS UNDER ENGLISH LAW 52-59 (1966); E. WADE & A. BRADLEY,
CONSTtrIONAL L.w 485-87, 528-29 (8th ed. 1970); A. WHSHERE, CRIMINAL PRO-
cEDuRE 30-32 (H.A. Palmer and H. Palmer 4th ed. 1961).
17. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
18. 116 U.S. at 629, quoting 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1073 (1765). Some have
interpreted this language in Entick to mean that a paper search violates principles
forbidding self-incrimination. D. FELL AN, THE DEFENDANT'S RioHs UNDER ENGLISH
[Vol. 6
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Perhaps the Earl of Chatam, speaking on the floor of the House of Com-
mons, most eloquently stressed the extreme character of the English
ideal:
The poorest man in his cottage may bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow
through it; the storm may enter it; but the King of England can not en-
ter it! All his power dares not cross the threshold of that ruined tene-
ment!19
Justice Bradley, in Boyd, did not go as far as the Earl since he was
able to perceive some circumstances under which the seizure of pri-
vate books and papers would be substantially different from compel-
ling an accused to be a witness against himself. 20  Books required by
law to be kept for inspection by revenue officers, for example, "are
necessarily excepted out of the category of unreasonable searches and
seizures." 2' 1
So, also, the laws which provide for the search and seizure of articles and
things which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for
the purpose of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tick-
ets, implements of gambling, etc., are not within this category. . .. In
the case of stolen goods, the owner from whom they were stolen is en-
titled to their possession; and in the case of excisable or dutiable arti-
cles, the government has an interest in them for the payment of the du-
ties thereon, and until such duties are paid has a right to keep them un-
der observation, or to pursue and drag them from concealment .... 22
Boyd, therefore, allowed the government to recover contraband
23
property or property not belonging to the accused, but prohibited the
LAw 53 (1966); L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FI=ru AimNDmENT 393 (1968). On the
other hand, Wigmore has argued that it should be read as saying only that a search
for evidence, like self-incrimination, should not be permitted because it is cruel and
unjust for the innocent to be confounded with the guilty. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2264, at 381 n.4 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES
IN CONSTITIONAL INTERPRETATION 53 (1969).
19. C. GOODRICH, SELEct BarrISH ELOQUENCE 65 (B. Aly ed. 1963).
20. Cf. text accompanying note 13 supra.
21. 116 U.S. at 623-24. The concept of "required records" raises issues which will be
excluded from the scope of this Comment. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1 (1948); Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Dis-
cordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966); Lipton, Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 323, 324-25 (1968); Meltzer, Re-
quired Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18
U. Cm. L. REv. 687 (1951).
22. 116 U.S. at 624.
23. Contraband is material the possession of which is made illegal because "it is
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seizure of private papers, i.e., papers belonging to the individual,
even when such seizure was considered critical to the interests of law
enforcement. When the papers are in the possession of the individual,
but are not legally owned by him (stolen property) or cannot be le-
gally owned (contraband), they are not his private papers and there-
fore they may be seized without violating the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments. Boyd thus created a "zone of privacy that [could] not be in-
vaded by the police through raids, by the legislators through laws, or
by magistrates through the issuance of warrants. 24  An individual's
private papers were absolutely protected from governmental seizure 25
based on the substantial privacy interest involved. Indeed, this prin-
ciple was recognized to involve the "very essence of constitutional lib-
erty and security, ' 26 since "[it is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the of-
fence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal secur-
ity, personal liberty and private property ....
Thirty-five years later the emphasis shifted in Gouled v. United
States.2" While Boyd had stressed that "[plapers are the owner's
* * * dearest property,"29 Gouled maintained that "[t]here is no spe-
cial sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of prop-
erty, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall
within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property
may be seized . . . ."0 Whereas Boyd would absolutely prohibit the
seizure of private papers, viewing such seizure as compulsory self-
incrimination, Gouled refused to place papers in a special category,
holding rather that seizure of any of an individual's property merely
(or is very likely to be) a step toward the doing of harm." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 425 (1972). Typically no property interest inheres
in the unlawful possession. For example, in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925), the Court recognized that "no property rights" existed in the contraband
liquor seized in the case. Id. at 143.
24. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 313 (1967) (Douglas J., dissenting).
25. The papers of an individual might be subject to search in rare situations when
the police were entitled to enter. For example, police might look for a stolen paper
and search through the person's papers to see if the object of the search was present.
But papers known to belong to an individual could not be the lawful subject of
seizure.
26. 116 U.S. at 630.
27. Id.
28. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
29. 116 U.S. at 627-28, quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066
(1765).
30. 255 U.S. at 309.
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for evidentiary purposes was constitutionally prohibited. 31 Such seiz-
ure would violate the Fourth Amendment 2 and the introduction of the
seized property into evidence would violate the Fifth Amendment.
33
Gouled's shift in emphasis provided a simple and logically appealing
31. Id. at 309-11.
32. Gouled held that the seizure of "mere evidence" violated the Fourth Amend-
ment even when the government proceeded by search warrant. 255 U.S. at 309-11.
It is unclear, however, which provision of the Fourth Amendment was believed to
have been transgressed. The Fourth Amendment contains two provisions. One
guarantees that "[the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,"
and the other insures that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Since the Gouled opinion
contended, inter alia, that "as a result of Boyd" search warrants could not be used for
the purpose of securing evidence, perhaps the Court meant that the searches in
Gouled, like those in Boyd, were "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Such
an interpretation is certainly linguistically permissible. The Fourth Amendment clearly
does not say that warrants must issue if the probable cause and particularity require-
ments are met. It merely directs that warrants shall not issue in the absence of such
elements. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment suggests that a warrant is per se
reasonable merely because there is probable cause and a sufficient description
of the object to be seized. Indeed, it has been suggested that the first clause of the
Fourth Amendment was designed "to cover shortcomings in warrants other than those
specified in the second clause ....... T. TAYLOR, Two STUDmS iN CONSTITuTIONAL
INTERPRFTATiON 43 (1969).
A serious objection to this interpretation of Gouled can be raised based on that part
of the opinion which states that "[tihe wording of the Fourth Amendment implies
that search warrants were in familiar use when the Constitution was adopted, and,
plainly, that when issued 'upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized',
searches and seizures made under them, are to be regarded as not unreasonable, and
therefore not prohibited by the amendment." 255 U.S. at 308. It is possible, of
course, that Gouled considered the "mere evidence" rule to be an exception to this
statement.
There is yet another way in which Gouled can be read. In Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the majority opinion maintained that "[in cases in which
the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, 'probable
cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the
constitutional mandate of reasonableness." 387 U.S. at 534. According to Camara,
reasonableness is determined "by balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails." Id. at 537. "If a valid public interest justifies the intru-
sion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search war-
rant." Id. at 539. Thus, it was emphasized that the probable cause requirement is de-
fined by "the controlling standard of reasonableness." Id. at 539. Read in this light,
Gouled must be interpreted as saying that, if probable cause is found, the search is
necessarily reasonable because probable cause is ultimately determined by the constitu-
tional mandate of reasonableness.
33. 255 U.S. at 311. But cf. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904).
For the modern approach see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (For a dis-
cussion of Couch see text accompanying notes 94-111 infra).
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basis for Boyd's list of permissible search situations, since searches and
seizures would be permitted when they were conducted for purposes
other than the mere seizure of evidence, that is, "when a primary right
to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the
public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or
in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the po-
lice power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful,
and provides that it may be taken.
'34
Although the emphasis on the importance of "papers" changed,
Gouled maintained Boyd's central proposition: the private liberty of
an individual is so important that it outweighs the claimed necessities
of law enforcement in seizing papers or other property for the sole
purpose of using them in evidence against him. Boyd and Gouled
thus guaranteed a zone of privacy which the government could not
breach to discover items of mere evidentiary value. 5
The absolutism of Boyd and Gouled did not survive the 1920's.
In 1927 Marron v. United States36 announced an exception which even-
tually swallowed the rule. In Marron the Court permitted a ledger
and certain bills to be seized on the theory that they were "part of the
outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense [the illegal
sale of intoxicating liquor]. ' '37 Such a theory went far beyond the
34. 255 U.S. at 309, citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886).
35. Although the Gouled Court spoke in terms of "mere evidence" rather than
papers, the only materials involved in the case were papers. The "mere evidence"
language could thus be dismissed as dicta. This point is strengthened by the fact that
in no case after Gouled did the Supreme Court suppress non-documentary evidence on
"mere evidence" grounds, although the Court still found it necessary to consider the
Gouled rule when discussing the seizure of non-documentary materials. See Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). However, the lower federal courts did suppress
non-documentary materials on "mere evidence" grounds. See, e.g., Morrison v.
United States, 262 F.2d 449, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (handkerchief bearing tangible
evidence of a "perverted" act); United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Supp. 765, 768-69
(N.D. Cal. 1951).
Chief Justice Traynor contended in People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 639, 408 P.2d
108, 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966), that
Gouled was not constitutionally based. He argued that the Court did not rely on
any specific constitutional language, although he did admit that the Court rested its
holding on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Noting that the federal statutes did
not authorize the seizure of purely evidentiary materials, he suggested that "[plerhaps
[the Court] meant no more than that the seizure was unconstitutional because seizures
that exceed statutory authority are always unreasonable." Id. at 640, 408 P.2d at
111, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 783. If this is what the Court meant it picked a strange way to
say it. The failure of the Gouled Court to mention the statute is difficult to reconcile
with Chief Justice Traynor's position.
36. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
37. Id. at 199.
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narrow confines of Boyd and Gouled, which had permitted police to
enter premises and seize property not belonging to the accused or prop-
erty which it was illegal to possess. Marron permitted the search and
seizure of non-contraband materials which did belong to an accused,
provided that they were utilized in the commission of a crime.
The seizure sanctioned in Marron might have been rationalized on
the ground that the government had a right to prevent the possession
of materials which could be expected to be used in future crimes.
Gouled seemingly paved the way for such a contention by suggesting
that the government would have a valid interest in preventing further
frauds by seizing an executed written contract, which was illegally ob-
tained and which was being utilized to perpetrate frauds upon the
Government.38 This suggestion was actually akin to classifying such
contracts, along with counterfeit coins or lottery tickets, as contra-
band."0 The ledger and bills in Marron, however, could not be so
classified. They were not contraband; they were "means and instru-
mentalities" of a crime already committed-the sale of intoxicating
liquors during Prohibition. 40  As such, they were seized not to prevent
the commission of future crimes but solely to exploit their value as
evidence.
Another justification for the search which the Marron Court might
have adopted is that an individual has an absolute right to the protec-
tion of property which has never been used in the commission of a
crime until probable cause exists to believe that such material has been
so used, at which point the value of public order would outweigh the
right of privacy. This justification could have been defended as a
realistic weighing of the values of order and liberty in a twentieth cen-
tury context.
Justice Butier did not adopt, or even discuss, either of the above ar-
guments. Instead, he merely asserted that materials which were "part
of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense" could
be lawfully seized, citing language in three prior cases,41 only one of
38. 255 U.S. at 310.
39. This raises the possibility that the contraband category could be used as a
Pandora's box. However, courts faithful to the principles of Boyd could provide lim-
its based on privacy or property. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Although Stanley did not cite Boyd, it contained language which furthers Boyd's
values, particularly the language approving of the appellants asserted "right to be free
from state inquiry into the contents of his library." Id. at 565.
40. Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), with United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
41. 275 U.S. at 199, citing Aguello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925);
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which offered even minimal support for his statement.42 Marron thus
sanctioned a significant exception to the rules established by Boyd and
Gouled and shifted the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
by denying to individuals an unqualified protection from the seizure
of their private papers and property.
By 1947 the Court could accurately summarize the status of the rule
by stating that:
This court has frequently recognized the distinction between merely
evidentiary materials, on the one hand, which may not be seized either
under the authority of a search warrant or during the course of a search
incident to arrest, and on the other hand, those objects which may val-
idly be seized including the instrumentalities and means by which a
crime is committed, the fruits of a crime such as stolen property, wea-
pons by which escape of the person arrested might be effected, and
property the possession of which is a crime.
43
As a matter of law, then, the "mere evidence" rule was retained. In
fact, however, its substance was lost. Courts soon began to find that
virtually any item could be a means and instrumentality of a crime.
44
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914).
42. In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), the Court dealt with the
question of whether or not a seizure of cocaine was made in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court noted "[tihe right . . . to search . . . to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits, or as the means by which it was committed, as
well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted."
269 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Since the search in Agnello
was determined to be in violation of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment (269 U.S. at 33), and since the cocaine would have been seizable under the
already existing contraband category (269 U.S. at 31), such language was dictum.
43. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947). The last case in which the
Court actually suppressed materials on "mere evidence" grounds was United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1932), but the rule was regularly considered in
determining whether suppression should be required. See, e.g., Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217, 234-35 (1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
But cf. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
44. As Yale Kamisar noted:
[ihe courts, to put it kindly, just don't take the rule very seriously.
While "a search for an object of purely evidentiary significance" may be taboo, ob-
jects have been and will continue to be found to possess a bit more than "purely
evidentiary significance" just about whenever a resourceful judge wants to so find.
Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN.
L. REv. 891, 915, 917 (1960).
See also Comment, Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment, 66 CoL. L.
Rav. 355, 369 (1966) (discussing application of the "mere evidence" rule to "seizures"
of conversations via eavesdropping).
1973] COMMENTS
One court even suggested that the shoes of a burglar were means and
instrumentalities since the criminal could not have gone barefoot. 4"
Another court permitted the seizure of a camera in a statutory rape
case, implying that it was a means of enticement.46 A rule subject to
such frivolity was hardly a powerful limit on searches and seizures.47
It rather became a flexible instrument in the hands of cynical
courts. The fact that the rule survived as a matter of law until 1968
was an indication of its weakness rather than its strength."
The Supreme Court insured a reexamination of the "mere evidence"
rule when it held that the Fourth Amendment's protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's ban on
self-incrimination are applicable to the states by virtue of the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause and that the constitutional
standards governing these protections are identical for the federal
government and the states.49  The prospect of applying the shadowy
45. United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1, 3-4 (7th Cir. 1958). But see Hayden v.
Warden, 363 F.2d 647, 652, 655 (4th Cir. 1966), rev'd. on other grounds, 387 U.S. 294
(1967). See also State v. Bisaccia, 213 A.2d 185, 192-93 (NJ. 1965).
46. State v. Chinn, 373 P.2d 392, 401 (Ore. 1962). The Chinn court noted that
"'[tlhe arts of seduction are so variant and insidious, especially when applied to
different individuals, that it is impossible as a matter of law to lay down any rule on
the subject of what will or will not invariably tend to produce delinquency in all
minors."' 373 P.2d at 401, quoting State v. Stone, 226 P. 430 (Ore. 1924). In
State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1971), the North Dakota Supreme Court found
not only that the clothing worn by the defendant was an instrumentality, but also that
a towel he used to wipe off blood was admissible on the same principle. Perhaps the
court in United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa. 1972), put it best when
it noted that courts had "torture[d] the English language to make the things the
Government seeks 'instrumentalities of the crime."' Id. at 1044.
47. "The 'mere evidence' rule has been used only to allow the courts an additional
method of articulating the difference between what is and what is not 'unreasonable.'"
Comment, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dimensions Of An "Intimate Rela-
tionship," 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 857, 861 n.22 (1966). It has been further suggested
that "[bly broadly defining 'instrumentality,' courts can admit evidence despite any
formal requirements of the doctrine, while at the same time can leave open the door
to the protection of privacy." Id. at 861.
48. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), suggested that Congress had helped
to perpetuate the rule by negative implication since it had not specifically authorized
the issuance of search warrants for the seizure of "mere evidence." Id. at 308.
State courts faced the absence of direct legislative authorization in different ways.
Compare State v. Angel, 177 S.E.2d 562, 570 (W. Va. 1970) (a statute which author-
ized search warrants for certain specific categories of property was held not to pro-
hibit or eliminate search warrants for other evidence of the commission of a crime),
with Ferguson v. State, 458 S.W.2d 383, 389 (Ark. 1970) (concurring opinion) (no
statutory or common law authority for the seizure of "mere evidence" exists in
Arkansas, and Warden did not authorize the seizure of "mere evidence" but merely
held that there were no constitutional objections to such a seizure).
49. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule
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"mere evidence" rule to fifty additional jurisdictions"° called for a
thorough reappraisal of the fundamental requirements of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments as soon as the appropriate case should reach
the Court.
11. THE DEMISE OF THE MERE EVIDENCE RULE
The appropriate case turned out to be Warden v. Hayden.5 1 In 1966
Maryland police officers, in the course of a lawful search, seized
clothing allegedly worn by the defendant in an armed robbery. 2  The
is an essential ingredient of the Fourth Amendment and that the rule is thus binding on
the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (announcing that the standard of reasonableness
is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 3, 6-7 (1964) (holding that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that the federal standards justifying an application of the privilege also applied to
the states).
50. A number of commentators concluded that Mapp, Ker and Malloy made the
"mere evidence" rule applicable to the states, noting that prior to these decisions
"state forums could avoid the application of the Gouled rule on the theory that the
rule was founded upon the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and
hence was not controlling in state prosecutions. This alternative is now foreclosed,
and the distinction between mere evidence and instrumentalities will confront state
judges as it has their federal colleagues since 1921." Shellow, The Continuing Vital-
ity of the Gouled Rule: The Search For And Seizure Of Evidence, 48 MARQ. L. Rav.
172, 180 (1964); accord, Comment, A Legislative Approach to the Fourth Amend-
ment, 45 NEB. L REv. 148, 154 (1966); Comment, Search and Seizure of "Mere
Evidence'--Amendment to Or. Rev. Stat. Sec. 141.010-Effect on Prior Law and
Constitutionality, 43 ORE. L REV. 333 (1964).
State court judges, however, did not agree. See People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635,
638-39, 408 P.2d 108, 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908
(1966) (discussed in note 35 supra). See also People v. Grossman, 276 N.Y.S.2d
168 (App. Div. 1966), and cases cited therein. But cf. State v. B3isaccia, 213 A.2d
185 (N.J. 1965) (contending that the seizure of mere evidence was constitutionally
prohibited, but that the only materials included in the category of mere evidence were
private papers). For a post-Warden contrast to Bisaccia see State v. Smith, 273 A.2d
68 (N.J. Super. 1971), wherein the court noted that "[w]e consequently are confident
that notwithstanding what was said in Bisaccia any general prohibition against seizure
of papers or documents merely because they may evidence the owner's complicity in
crime is no longer viable." Id. at 76.
One commentator has suggested that twenty-three states followed the Gouled rule
even prior to Mapp. Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEO.
LJ. 593, 616-17 & n.149 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Evidentiary Searches], quoted in
Hudak, The "Mere Evidence" Rule: Need for Re-evaluation, 20 CLEv. ST. L. Rav.
361, 373 & n.70 (1971), and cited in 20 ALA. L. Rav. 149, 154 n.32 (1967). However,
the twenty-three states are those which followed the exclusionary rule before Mapp,
not the Gouled rule. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1959).
51. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
52. Hayden v. Warden, 363 F.2d 647, 649 (4th Cir. 1966).
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defendant claimed the clothing was mere evidence and was therefore
not subject to seizure. A divided panel in the Fourth Circuit criticized
the "mere evidence" rule,5 3 but felt constrained by precedent and sup-
pressed the evidence. 54  Even the majority opinion, however, invited
reversal,55 and in Warden, Justice Brennan, speaking for six justices,
accepted the invitation.55
Justice Brennan rejected the "mere evidence" rule for several rea-
sons. He noted that courts57 and commentators 8 had criticized it,
that the language of the Fourth Amendment did not support it,59 that
it did not protect privacy,60 and that it elevated fictional property con-
cepts to a central role in the Fourth Amendment. 1 He suggested that
the government's right to seize an item rested not on a superior prop-
erty right in the item, but on the right to apprehend and convict crimi-
nals. 62  Instead of focusing on a property basis for the Fourth
Amendment, he suggested that the "principal object of the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of privacy." 63  Searches which intruded
on that privacy could be sanctioned "after fulfilling the probable cause
and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment and after
the intervention of 'a neutral and detached magistrate ,' "64 and
53. Id. at 655.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 387 U.S. at 310.
57. Id. at 300, citing People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 780 (1965) (discussed in note 35 supra).
58. 387 U.S. at 300, citing Chaffee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35
HAnv. L. REv. 673 (1922); Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Pro-
fessor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 891, 914-18 (1960); Kaplan, Search and Seizure:
A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CA rn. L. R.v. 474, 478 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Kaplan]; Comment, Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 355 (1966); Comment, Limitations On Seizure of "Evidentiary" Ob-
jects: A Rule In Search Of A Reason, 20 U. CH. L. REv. 319 (1953); Comment,
Search, Seizure, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 31 YALE L.J. 518 (1922). For
some useful post-Warden commentary see note 4 supra.
59. 387 U.S. at 301.
60. Id. at 301-02.
61. Id. at 304.
62. Id. at 306.
63. Id. at 304. But cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967), wherein
it was stated that Fourth Amendment protections "often have nothing to do with
privacy at all." If a policeman seizes an automobile in broad daylight without prob-
able cause of any kind, the car owner's privacy would not be disturbed, but presumably
the Fourth Amendment would still protect the property rights involved. In fact, the
Fourth Amendment protects both privacy and property. General slogans about their
relative ranking may achieve force as slogans, but they offer little service in legal
analysis.
64. 387 U.S. at 309-10, quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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property subject to search could be seized if it would aid in a particu-
lar apprehension or conviction.0 5 There had to be "a nexus. . . be-
tween the item to be seized and criminal behavior."' 6
Thus, the attack on the Gouled "mere evidence" rule which began
in Marron finally became a rout. Marron created the means and
instrumentalities exception without explaining why and the Warden
Court simply assumed that the exception was based on the unsupport-
able theory that the state somehow gained a property interest in means
and instrumentalities but not in mere evidence. 67 Such a theory was
easy to topple and certainly posed no problem for the Warden Court.
In the Court's view the question then became whether Gouled's require-
ment of a governmental property interest in the item to be seized rep-
resented a correct interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Placing
great emphasis on the development of privacy as the primary interest
being protected by that amendment, the Court rejected "fictional and
procedural barriers rested on property concepts" and overruled Gouled. 8
The difficulty with the analysis in Warden, however, becomes clear
upon a reexamination of Gouled. Gouled did not seek to protect prop-
erty only, but sought to protect privacy as well.6 In fact, Gouled ar-
guably offers more protection for privacy than Warden. Faithful ap-
plication of the Gouled categories would have sharply limited the op-
portunities for state intrusions into privacy.70 The means and instru-
mentalities exception of Marron multiplied the opportunities for police
searches71 and Warden's elimination of the "mere evidence" rule cre-
ated even more.
65. Id. at 307.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 302.
68. Id. at 303-06, 310.
69. 255 U.S. at 303-06.
70. See Wool, Lawful Objects of Search and Seizure, 5 WM. & MARy L. RaV. 101,
124-26 (1964). See also note 44 supra. This is not to suggest that the Gouled
rule should have been retained, but rather to say that its idealistic weighing of privacy
and order deserved "a more respectful burial." Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 349 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (using the phrase in discussing the re-
versal of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
71. See Evidentiary Searches, supra note 50, at 610: "Under [the Marron] cri-
teria, there was very little that would not be subject to seizure." Indeed, Marron
expanded seizable objects to the point that it could rightly be contended that the rule
no longer effectively protected privacy. As noted by Kaplan, supra note 58, "[t]he
privacy of the individual, however, would be just as well served by a restriction on the
search to the even-numbered days of the month. Presumably this would have an equal
restrictive effect." Id. at 478-79.
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The actual holding of Warden was that a man's non-documentary
effects could be seized during a lawful search to be used as evidence.
72
Warden raised but did not resolve the issue of whether there are cir-
cumstances under which private papers should be immune from
search and seizure.73 Warden noted only that:
The items of clothing involved in this case are not "testimonial" or
"communicative" in nature, and their introduction therefore did not com-
pel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. This case thus does not require that we consider
whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature pre-
cludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure7 4
72. 387 U.S. at 300-01, 302-03. One court, however, has held to a slender thread
by declaring a search for evidence of motive to be illegal despite Warden, noting that
"[n]o decision has been found upholding a seizure of evidence during a search solely
for evidence, as here." United States v. Zive, 299 F. Supp. 1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). Zive interpreted Warden as authorizing the use of "mere evidence" only when
seized in a search for contraband, instrumentalities or other seizable items.
73. See 387 U.S. at 303.
74. Id. at 302-03, citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In
Schmerber, the defendant was convicted of driving an automobile while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor. 384 U.S. at 758. At the direction of a policeman and
without defendant's consent, a physician withdrew blood from Schmerber's body. A
report of the chemical analysis was later admitted at the trial despite objection. Id.
at 758-59. The Supreme Court held that "the privilege protects an accused only from
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence
of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of blood and use of
the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends."
Id. at 761 (footnote omitted). Nor did this intrusion into the human body violate the
Fourth Amendment guarantees. Id. at 772. The Warden Court cited Schmerber
to support the idea that "[tlhis court has approved the seizure and introduction of
items having only evidential value . . . ." 387 U.S. at 301 n.8. This led the ma-
jority to conclude that the "mere evidence" rule was "based on premises no longer
accepted as rules governing the application of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
300-01 (footnote omitted).
But Schmerber was entirely consistent with the "mere evidence" rule; the courts
had consistently held that the rule did not apply to searches of the person. The lan-
guage most frequently cited for this position is contained in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914), which discussed the "right on the part of the Government, al-
ways recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused
when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." Id.
at 392 (emphasis added). Indeed, Schmerber cites the Weeks language, noting that
the rights may be "unrestricted." 384 U.S. at 769. As Learned Hand observed in
United States v. Kirchenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926), "[it is true that the
law has never distinguished between documents and other property found upon the
person of one arrested. All may be used in the trial, so far as relevant."
On the other hand, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964), used
language which suggested that the lower courts' interpretation of the Weeks dictum
might have been erroneous: "[Wlhen a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the
right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of
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The first sentence of the quotation says that the seizure of non-testi-
monial items would not violate the Fifth Amendment; it does not say
that the seizure of testimonial items would be prohibited.7 The sec-
ond sentence of the quotation expressly leaves that issue open. War-
den offered no advice in this area and subsequent decisions of the
Court have produced only occasional hints.
I. POST WARDEN: THE SuPREME COURT
Barely two weeks after Warden was decided, Justice Clark presented
the opinion of the Court in Berger v. New York,70 wherein a New York
eavesdropping statute was struck down on a number of Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 7 One Fourth Amendment objection
was not accepted, however. The defendant in Berger had argued
that the use of evidence obtained through eavesdropping violated the
"mere evidence" rule.78  The claim had force despite the ruling in War-
den because the things seized in Berger were words of the defendant 0
and as such were testimonial in character. Nevertheless, the majority
in Berger dismissed the claim in an abrupt footnote which stated that
"[t]bis contention is disposed of in Warden . . . adversely to peti-
tioner's assertion here."8' 0
Some writers"1 have interpreted this cryptic comment to mean that
the "mere evidence" rule no longer protects testimonial items.
82  If
the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime."
The inference to be drawn from Preston is that the phrase "evidences of crime" as
used in Weeks does not mean "mere evidence" but is limited to the other traditional
categories. Preston's language and Warden's treatment of Schmerber suggest that ma-
terials can be seized during a search of the person only if they could also be seized
during a search of the premises.
75. Nevertheless, some writers have concluded from this statement that the seizure
of testimonial objects would violate the Fifth Amendment. 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 122,
127-28 (1967); 6 DUQUESNE U.L. REV. 60, 63-64 (1967).
76. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
77. Id. at 44.
78. Id. at 43-44.
79. Id. at 45. The Berger case was briefed and argued before Warden was decided.
80. Id. at 44 n.2.
81. E.g., 32 ALBANY L. REV. 229, 236 n.42 (1967); Hudak, The "Mere Evidence"
Rule: Need for Re-evaluation, 20 CLEV. ST. L. RhV. 361, 377 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Hudak].
82. Congress has apparently accepted this interpretation. It amended the United
States Code to permit federal officers to seize "any property that constitutes evi-
dence of a criminal offense in violation of the laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3103(a) (1970) (emphasis added); see Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 148 n.4 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
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these writers are correct, Boyd has also been overruled since it held
that an individual's testimonial items could not be seized.83 Such an in-
terpretation, however, assumes that Boyd was overruled sub silentia in a
cavalier footnote, that a majority which was careful in Warden to con-
fine its holding to non-testimonial items would extend that holding with-
out discussion two weeks later, and that Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Fortas, who in Warden had criticized the majority's abolition of the
"mere evidence" rule, would be willing to extend the Warden reasoning
without discussion. These considerations suggest there might be another
way to read the controversial footnote in Berger. Since the Court de-
cided the case on Fourth Amendment grounds and did not reach the
petitioner's Fifth Amendment claim, 84 the Berger footnote can be read
as having stated that (1) the Court would not strike down the seizure of
the item solely because it was "mere evidence" and (2) the Fifth Amend-
ment claim that testimonial materials cannot be seized not having been
reached, there was no reason to decide whether the seizure of such ma-
terials would violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments taken to-
gether.Yr Interpreted in this fashion, Berger restates but does not ex-
tend Warden.
Other writers have suggested that the Warden principle was extended
to testimonial utterances in Katz v. United States.8 6 In Katz the govern-
ment introduced evidence of the petitioner's part of a telephone con-
versation to prove that he had transmitted wagering information by
telephone in violation of federal law.87 The Court, while finding the
particular search to be invalid since it was not authorized by a war-
rant, 8 stated:
[I]t is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that
a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such in-
vestigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to pro-
ceed, and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could
constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very
83. 116 U.S. at 622.
84. 388 U.S. at 43-44.
85. Cf. 116 U.S. at 630: "[A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
... private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime . . . is within the
condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
run almost into each other."
86. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The confusion surrounding the interpretation of Katz
is profound. Compare 46 TuL. L. R-v. 545, 550 (1972) (contending that Katz
makes any evidence, testimonial or otherwise, subject to seizure), with Hudak, supra
note 81, at 377 (contending Katz ruled that "testimonial" evidence cannot be seized).
87. 389 U.S. at 348. The statute allegedly violated was 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1970).
88. 389 U.S. at 359.
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limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took
place.8
9
Thus, Katz indicated that under carefully controlled circumstances
the police could engage in the electronic surveillance of telephonic com-
munications. 90  This could be interpreted to mean that Warden has
been extended to items of a testimonial or communicative nature. This
interpretation loses support, however, when the actual evidence in Katz
is analyzed. The utterances at issue in Katz were wagering informa-
tion 91 and thus would be classified as means and instrumentalities of a
crime rather than as mere evidence. 2 Furthermore, Katz did not deal
with private papers and thus offers little assistance in determining
whether there are circumstances in which private papers should be
immune from search and seizure.93
More helpful is the Court's recent opinion in Couch v. United States,
94
which reaffirms the continuing validity of Boyd by attempting to dis-
tinguish it. 5 In Couch the defendant objected to an Internal Revenue
summons directing her accountant to produce business records which
she had given to him over a period of fourteen years for use in preparing
her income tax returns.96 The accountant did not object to the sum-
mons, but the defendant asserted that the summons violated her Fifth
Amendment rights.9 7 She contended that, although the records con-
89. Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 354 n.14.
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1970). Such "material" could have been seized even
under the "mere evidence" rule.
93. The seizure of some types of papers could constitute a more serious intrusion
into privacy than the seizure of telephonic communications. See note 163 infra and
text accompanying notes 154-64 infra.
In addition, the Fifth Amendment's concern with compulsion could be important
when contrasting the seizure of private papers with the seizure of telephonic com-
munications. Effective wiretapping would preclude the possibility of compulsion be-
cause compulsion involves prior notice. More traditional searches and seizures, on
the other hand, proceed under the threat of legally authorized force. Compulsion is
ordinarily inherent in such searches and seizures. Whether this distinction should
lead to different treatment is a matter which Katz did not and could not decide.
Of course, in some circumstances, searches involve no personal compulsion of
the defendant. If the materials are in the possession of another or if the defendant is
not home when the officers search, no personal compulsion is employed. Note that
even if the defendant is home he is not compelled to say anything or do anything. He is
merely compelled not to interfere. See text accompanying notes 185-95 infra.
94. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
95. Id. at 330-31; see id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 324-25.
97. Id.
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cededly were in the possession of the accountant, the government
nevertheless sought the type of forcible extortion of her testimony which
Boyd had condemned.9
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, distinguished Boyd by noting
that:
That case did not, however, address or contemplate the divergence of
ownership and possession, and petitioner concedes that court deci-
sions applying Boyd have largely been in instances where possession
and ownership conjoined. In Boyd, the production order was directed
against the owner of the property who, by responding, would have been
forced "to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects
that might incriminate him." But we reiterate that in the instant
case there was no enforced communication of any kind from any ac-
cused or potential accused.99
Taken alone, this language would suggest that Boyd has been limited
to situations involving enforced communication by the accused in a
summons or subpoena context. If the government proceeded by search
and seizure against the accused and seized papers in his possession Boyd
would apparently not be violated because the accused would not be
compelled "to produce and authenticate any personal documents or
effects that might incriminate him." This result is consistent with a
narrow reading of Boyd since Boyd involved a demand that the defend-
ant produce a document that might incriminate him, but it ignores
the reasoning of the majority in Boyd which emphasized that the con-
stitutionally offensive aspect of the case was not that the defendant
was asked to authenticate the document, but that the document, pri-
vate in nature and obtained through the use of governmental force, was
to be introduced in evidence against the owner.100 As the Boyd Court
stated:
[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.101
[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the
owner . . . is the equivalent of a search and seizure .... 102
If the Boyd reasoning regarding searches and seizures is not followed,
all that will remain of Boyd is its factual holding. The question, there-
98. Id. at 330; see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
99. 409 U.S. at 330-31 (footnotes and citations omitted and emphasis added).
100. 116 U.S. at 630.
101. Id. at 633.
102. Id. at 634-35.
1973]
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fore, is whether this was the result sought by the Court in Couch. If the
language of Justice Powell referring to authentication is read in isola-
tion such a conclusion seems inescapable. There are, however, sev-
eral other portions of Justice Powell's opinion which indicate a dif-
ferent result. For instance, at one point he listed two recent cases to
exemplify the fact that Boyd's application has largely been confined to
situations where ownership and possession merged. 103 The first case
involved a search and seizure of records in the possession of the defend-
ant. 0 4 At another place in the opinion, he explicitly left open the
question of what result would obtain if a case were presented in which
a defendant asserted Fifth Amendment rights when a mere custodian
of the defendant's records was forced to produce them. 05 Justice
Powell distinguished such a situation from the facts being considered
in Couch:
Here there was no mere fleeting divestment of possession: the records
had been given to this accountant regularly since 1955 and remained in
his continuous possession until the summer of 1968 when the summons
was issued. Moreover, the accountant himself worked neither in pe-
titioner's office nor as his employee. The length of his possession of
petitioner's records and his independent status confirm the belief that
petitioner's divestment of possession was of such a character as to dis-
qualify her entirely as an object of any impermissible Fifth Amend-
ment compulsion.100
Thus, Justice Powell conceded that there may be circumstances in which
the Fifth Amendment privilege applies even though the defendant is
not personally compelled to produce or authenticate anything. He re-
fused to recognize such a privilege in Couch simply because there is
little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an account-
ant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information
therein is required in an income tax return. What information is not
disclosed is largely in the accountant's discretion, not petitioner's ...
Accordingly, petitioner here cannot reasonably claim, either for Fourth
or Fifth Amendment purposes, an expectation of protected privacy or
confidentiality1 67
The obvious implication is that if a significant privacy intrusion were
involved the result might be different on Fourth or Fifth Amendment
103. 409 U.S. at 330.
104. Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)
(discussed at text accompanying notes 112-27 infra).
105. 409 U.S. at 333-34.
106. Id. at 334-35 (footnotes omitted).
107. Id. at 335-36 (footnotes omitted).
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grounds. Also significant in this connection are Justice Powells con-
clusion that the petitioner's Fourth Amendment argument "does not
appear to be independent of her Fifth Amendment argument'108 and
his statement that "[w]e do indeed attach constitutional importance to
possession, but only because of its close relationship to those personal
compulsions and intrusions which the Fifth Amendment forbids." '
Thus, although not serving as a model of clarity, the Couch opinion
can sensibly be read as holding that the Fifth Amendment bars the
compelled production by subpoena of property within the possession
of the accused. If the material is not within the possession of the ac-
cused, however, or if the government proceeds by search and seizure,
the validity of the state action will be evaluated by Fourth and Fifth
Amendment concerns for privacy.110 Such an interpretation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments appears to properly place the emphasis
of the inquiry regarding the search and seizure of papers on the pri-
vacy interests involved as opposed to their incriminatory nature."1
Couch could serve as a general starting point for determining the
circumstances in which private papers can be seized. Couch, however,
does not focus on search and seizure and certainly does not attempt to
develop any standards for guidance. Thus, from Warden to Couch,
the lower federal courts have been left to deal with the issue of search
and seizure of private papers without the benefit of any definitive
standards. Predictably, the lower courts have analyzed this problem in
different ways.
IV. POST WARDEN: THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Since Warden the lower federal courts have encountered many cases
involving the search and seizure of private papers. While courts have
regularly admitted documentary evidence without much discussion,
112
108. Id. at 325-26 n.6.
109. Id. at 336 n.20.
110. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), wherein Justice Douglas
noted that "[tihe Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citi-
zen to create a zone of privacy ... ." Id. at 484.
111. See text accompanying notes 185-95 infra.
112. The absence of discussion in most cases may well be related to the lack of a
serious privacy interest involved. Post-Warden cases admitting documentary evidence
in addition to United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 984 (1971) (discussed at text accompanying notes 128-40 infra), and
United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972)
(discussed at text accompanying notes 141-53 infra), include: Romanelli v. Commis-
sioner, 466 F.2d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 1972) (gambling records); United States v. Mahler,
442 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971) (extortion case in which
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the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in Hill v. Philpott113
that some items cannot be the object of a lawful search and seizure.
11 4
In Hill, the district court judge had authorized search warrants for
sexually revealing photographs of a girl, as well as envelopes and cards bearing the
names and addresses of those to whom photographs were to be sent, were seized);
United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 775 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971)
(bookmaking records, wagering paraphernalia and tape recording of defendants giving
line information and accepting wagers); United States v. Cozzetti, 441 F.2d 344 (9th
Cir. 1971) (business records seized in prostitution case); United States v. Hanon,
428 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971) (gambling parapher-
nalia); United States v. Munroe, 421 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851
(1970) (forgery case permitting the seizure of papers as handwriting exemplars);
United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949
(1971) (index cards with license plate numbers of narcotic agents); Pinelli v. United
States, 403 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1968) (did not reach the issue but recognized that
Warden left the issue open); Taylor v. Minnesota, 342 F. Supp. 911 (D. Minn.
1972) (memorandum giving instructions to the defendant's wife regarding preparation
of prostitutes); United States v. Iannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (gambling
paraphernalia); United States v. McNally, 338 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (gambling
paraphernalia); Vanderahe v. Howland, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 71-1176, 1181-82 (N.D.
Cal. 1971), rev'd, 13 CRiM. L. RBP. 1019 (9th Cir. March 26, 1973) (tax records);
United States v. Main, 312 F. Supp. 736 (D. Del. 1970) (gambling records); Appli-
cation of Paperboard Sales, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (papers used in
and pertaining to transactions and property interests of defendant taken from business
office); United States v. Zovluck, 274 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (medical rec-
ords); A.H. Alexander, 56 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. 491 (1971) (gambling records); LaBryer
v. State, 222 So. 2d 361 (Ct. App. Ala. 1969) (paper written by defendant to alleged
victim of sodomous attack); People v. Crosslin, 251 Cal. App. 2d 968, 60 Cal. Rptr.
309 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1968) (identification card, temporary driver's
license, and marriage certificate); People v. Rehman, 253 Cal. App. 2d 119, 61
Cal. Rptr. 65 (1967) (papers comprising part of business files); People v. Piwtorak,
484 P.2d 1227 (Colo. 1971) (letters, name tags, and dog tags); Scott v. State, 176
S.E.2d 481 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970) (false license to practice medicine, diploma, books
and telephone directories); People v. Pickett, 233 N.E.2d 560 (I1. 1968) (policy
gambling tickets); People v. Jones, 231 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 1967) (auto registration);
Crawford v. State, 267 A.2d 317 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (pawn tickets);
State v. Glenn, 431 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. 1968) (forged notes); State v. Charest,
247 A.2d 515 (N.H. 1968) (slips of paper bearing names of individuals re-
moved from person of accused); State v. Campbell, 250 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1969)
(lottery papers); State v. Smith, 273 A.2d 68 (N.J. Super. 1971) (letter to de-
fendant from a friend in Vietnam which incriminated the defendant); People v.
Givens, 237 N.E.2d 80 (N.Y. 1968) (loan sharking records); State v. Garrett,
489 P.2d 994 (Ore. Ct. App. 1971) (letters and birth certificate used to tie defend-
ant to a residence); Haynes v. State, 475 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (en-
velope admitted to show letter was addressed to defendant at apartment); State v.
Bullock, 431 P.2d 195 (Wash. 1967) (letter written by defendant which incriminated
him); Morales v. State, 170 N.W.2d 684 (Wisc. 1969) (documents connecting defend-
ant to a residence, including telephone bills, special delivery mail notice, and a re-
ceipt for a registered letter).
113. 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
114. Id. at 14R.
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"fiscal records relating to the income and expenses of Dr. Vincent R.
Hill from his medical practice and other sources . . . ."I" Dr. Hill
then moved for the return of his "private" books and records but the
court denied his request.11 On appeal the Seventh Circuit held that
the seizure of the books and papers violated the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination. 7 Initially, the court of appeals
recognized that the "distinction between obtaining papers from a de-
fendant by search and seizure rather than by force of process is more
shadow than substance."1 1 " The Seventh Circuit thus agreed with
Gouled that:
In practice the result is the same to one accused of crime, whether he
be obliged to supply evidence against himself or whether such evidence
be obtained by an illegal search of his premises and seizure of his pri-
vate papers. In either case he is the unwilling source of the evidence,
and the Fifth Amendment forbids that he shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself in a criminal case. 119
Hill decided that the combination of Boyd and Gouled required that
the records of Dr. Hill be immune from seizure.1 20  The Seventh Cir-
cuit was not deterred from this conclusion by the holding in Warden
because:
In overruling Gouled as to its Fourth Amendment teachings, we do not
believe that the Court intended to in any way diminish the Fifth
Amendment characteristics which might attach to certain items of
property such as personal books and records.'
21
The Hill court noted that, in the term prior to Warden, the Supreme
Court in Schmerber v. California22 had
clearly intimated that in any case where a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment also involves Fifth Amendment claims, the first step in
considering a motion to suppress is to determine whether the introduc-
115. United States v. Premises, 801 North Seventh Street, 310 F. Supp. 1316, 1318
(S.D. Ill. 1970).
116. Id. at 1321.
117. 445 F.2d at 149.
118. Id. The court noticed that if the government had proceeded by subpoena or
summons "many if not all of the records seized" would have been privileged from
disclosure. Id. at 149; accord, Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Re, 313 F.
Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Kleckner, 273 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. Ohio),
appeal dismissed, 382 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1967).
119. 445 F.2d at 149, quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921).
120. Id. at 147-49.
121. Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
122. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (discussed in note 74 supra).
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tion into evidence of the material seized would violate the Fifth Amend-
ment. This is to be determined by inquiry as to whether the evidence
"relates to some communicative act or writing." If it does, the search
is barred under both Amendments. 128
It is possible that the Hill court was able to suppress the papers be-
cause of Warden rather than in spite of it, since Warden eliminated any
distinction between mere evidence and instrumentalities. The district
court judge in Hill had noted that the "affidavits for search warrants
. . .established that the papers, books, records, and documents sought
to be seized were the instrumentalities by which the crimes of will-
fully attempted tax evasion had been and were then being committed.
... As instrumentalities . .. they were subject to seizure.' 24  The
court of appeals, on the other hand, made no attempt to classify the pa-
pers since it read Warden as making such classifications meaningless. 125
Thus, the Hill court interpreted the opinion in Warden to mean that
some items which could be seized prior to Warden may not be seizable
after Wirden. It is unclear how far the Seventh Circuit meant to go in
Hill. If it meant to hold that testimonial or communicative items can
never be seized, it went very far indeed. The Supreme Court, presented
with an opportunity to clarify the scope of Warden, instead denied
certiorari and let the Seventh Circuit's decision stand.' 20
Quite recently the Ninth Circuit adopted the Hill approach in
Vanderahe v. Howland.127  However, the other circuits have not been
123. 445 F.2d at 148.
124. 310 F. Supp. at 1320.
125. 445 F.2d at 148.
126. Of course, a denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion
upon the merits of the case. United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923).
"A denial of certiorari means only that, for one reason or another which is seldom
disclosed, and not infrequently for conflicting reasons which may have nothing to do
with ... any view of the merits taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four
members of the Court who thought the case should be heard." Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953). However, the Hill decision was apparently approved
by the Court in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). See text accompanying
notes 103-04 supra.
127. 13 CaIm. L. RaP. 1019 (9th Cir. March 26, 1973). Hill has received a
chilly reception in some quarters. In addition to United States v. Blank, 459
F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (discussed at text ac-
companying notes 141-53 infra), see A.H. Alexander, 56 P-H Tax Ct. Rep.
491, 495 (1971) (permitting the seizure of gambling records); Taylor v. Minne-
sota, 342 F. Supp. 911, 917 (D. Minn. 1972) (upholding the seizure of a mem-
orandum giving instructions to the defendant's wife regarding preparation of
prostitutes). The Seventh Circuit itself has recently distinguished the Hill analysis as
it applies to "wagering slips and the like." Romanelli v. Commissioner, 466 F.2d 872,
877-78 n.9 (7th Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit has distinguished Hill on the ground
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prepared to go as far as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. The leading
decision upholding the search and seizure of private papers is United
States v. Bennett,'2 8 which was decided by the Second Circuit. In Ben-
nett, federal agents conducted a search incidental to a valid arrest for
participation in a conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics. The
agents found two address books containing the telephone numbers of
one "Jessup," the business card of an "Austin Burke," and a letter from
"Egan" to "Farris or Joyce."' 29  The court held that the address book
and business card would have qualified as instrumentalities under pre-
Warden standards and were therefore seizable,130 but found that the Egan
letter would not have so qualified and announced, without discussion,
that the Warden caveat demanded discussion only of the Egan letter.''
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were distinguished on the ground
that "the Fourth Amendment does not protect broadly against the
seizure of things whose compulsory production would be forbidden by
the Fifth."'" 2 The court reasoned that:
The Fifth Amendment would have prohibited a subpoena requiring [the
production of] the address books and Egan's business card, on the basis
that by responding he would be giving testimony that "the articles pro-
duced are the ones demanded," yet no one could have seriously as-
serted, even before Hayden, that the Fourth Amendment protected such
papers against seizure pursuant to a search warrant or a reasonable
search incident to a lawful arrest.83
Bennett had to dispose of Boyd because in Boyd seven Justices did in
fact seriously assert such a proposition. 34  The court thus stated that
"Mr. Justice Bradley's dicta" had been largely repudiated by War-
den.1
35
Bennett suggested "with deference" that an "approach geared to the
that records which are part of a regulatory scheme with public purposes are not pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment and are specifically excluded from the holding in Hill.
United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit had re-
jected the principles of Hill even before they were announced. United States v.
Bennett, 459 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969) (discussed at text accompanying notes 128-40
infra). For a comparative discussion of Hill and the district court's decision in
Vanderahe (subsequently reversed), see Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of
Search Warrants to Obtain Tax Records, 6 GA. L. Rnv. 399 (1972).
128. 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
129. Id. at 895.
130. Id. at 896.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 896-97 (citation omitted).
134. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
135. 409 F.2d at 896.
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objective of the Fourth Amendment to secure privacy would seem more
promising than one based on the testimonial character of what is
seized,"'" and maintained that the post-Warden task was to guard
against unlimited searches, 137 noting:
The reason why we shrink from allowing a personal diary to be the ob-
ject of a search is that the entire diary must be read to discover
whether there are incriminating entries; most of us would feel rather
differently with respect to a "diary" whose cover page bore the title
"Robberies I Have Performed." Similarly the abhorrence generally
felt with respect to "rummaging" through the contents of a desk to find
an incriminating letter would not exist in the same measure if the letter
were lying in plain view.138
Thus, in contrast to Boyd, which was concerned with the object of the
search, Bennett's concern was with the method. The Bennett court there-
fore had no difficulty admitting the Egan letter, which it termed "mere
evidence":'
3 9
Having found the letter in the course of a lawful search, the agents
would have been entitled, even under pre-Hayden law, to read it to see
whether it was an "instrumentality" for effecting the conspiracy ....
The clear import of Hayden is to abolish any distinction because the
letter turned out to be "mere evidence" of a conspiracy rather than a
proposal to continue it. To hold that seizure of Egan's letter was im-
permissible would elevate the caveat. . . above the holding.140
136. Id.
137. Id. at 897.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 896, 897.
140. Id. at 897 (footnote omitted). The letter from Egan to "Farris or Joyce"
was found in a woman's pocketbook in the bedroom closet. Id. at 895. Although
the arrest was made prior to the Court's decision in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), which limited searches incidental to arrest to the "arrestee's person and the
area 'within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destrictible evidence" (Id.
at 763), Judge Friendly, the author of the Bennett decision, contended at the 47th
annual meeting of the American Law Institute that the seizure of the purse, the
opening of the purse, and the subsequent reading of the letter would be "proper even
under Chimel." 47 ALI PROCEEDINGS 79 (1971).
The idea that agents have the right to read a letter merely because it is in plain
view is a dangerous extension of the plain view doctrine and a dangerous inroad
on the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 569-72 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Stanley, Justice Stewart
noted that since the warrant did not authorize the seizure of films, and since the
content of the films seized could not be determined by mere inspection, the officers
had no right to view them. This analogy appears equally applicable to certain papers
which must be more than merely "inspected," but must be read in detail.
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Bennett appears to support the proposition that there are not any
items whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a rea-
sonable search and seizure. Rather, any evidence which would aid in
a particular apprehension or conviction can be seized, provided that it
can be obtained without unreasonable rummaging through non-incrim-
inating materials. When contrasted with the conclusion of Hill that no
testimonial evidence can ever be seized, it is clear that the Second and
Seventh Circuits "follow" Warden down two separate paths.
A third route has been taken by the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Blank.'4' In Blank a search warrant had been issued for the seizure of
bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia. 142  The materials
were found and seized by F.B.I. agents, and the defendant filed a mo-
tion to suppress on the ground that such materials were testimonial, po-
tentially self-incriminating, and thus not subject to search and seiz-
ure. 4  The district court ordered the material suppressed, 44 citing the
decision in Hill. 45 On appeal a unanimous court reversed and held
that the items were admissible.' 46 In so ruling the court partially fol-
lowed Bennett:
[There is a valid and important distinction between records sought
by subpoena and records sought by search warrant. The subpoena
compels the person receiving it by his own response to identify the doc-
uments delivered as the ones described in the subpoena. The search
warrant involves no such element of compulsion upon an actual or po-
tential defendant.147
Blank thus concluded that "the valid search warrant does not 'compel'
the defendant to do anything in Fifth Amendment terms."' 48  Unlike
Bennett, however, Blank contended that in the absence of such com-
pulsion the "[a]ppellee's ultimate reliance. . must be upon the right of
privacy as described by the Supreme Court in Fifth Amendment terms in
Warden v. Hayden and Schmerber v. California and in Fourteenth
Amendment terms in Griswold v. Connecticut."'4 Applying this stand-
ard, the Sixth Circuit found that the subjects of the seizure were not "per-
sonal communications at all but rather business accounts rendered extra-
141. 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
142. Id. at 384.
143. Id.
144. United States v. Blank, 330 F. Supp. 783, 784-86 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
145. 459 F.2d at 384.
146. Id. at 387.
147. Id. at 385.
148. Id. at 386.
149. Id. (citations omitted).
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ordinary only by the fact that the business is itself illegal."' 5 The court
thought it important to point out that "[t]hese are not privately recorded
and privately held thoughts or descriptions of events, as in the case of a
closely held diary, but rather business records of which other persons
must have knowledge."'' Indeed, the court even concluded that the
papers were not "communicative in nature.' 1 52 As an alternative ration-
ale the court noted that the papers were instrumentalities of a crime and
were therefore subject to seizure on that ground.'
5 3
Blank thus struck a middle ground between Hill and Bennett. Hill
ruled that testimonial evidence is inherently unseizable while Bennett
ruled that no item of evidence is inherently unseizable. Blank suggested
that certain personal and private types of communication are not sub-
ject to seizure, provided that they are not instrumentalities of a crime.
It is obvious that such differences in approach to a fundamental ques-
tion must ultimately be resolved. The relevant policy arguments must
be considered and a generally applicable standard must be adopted by
the Supreme Court to govern the search and seizure of private papers.
V. THE RELEVANT POLICY ARGUMENTS
It is proposed that any judgment as to whether private papers should
be permissible objects of a search and seizure should be guided by a
balancing of four factors: (1) the extent of the intrusion into the
suspect's privacy, (2) the gravity of the offense, (3) the extent to
which the papers are utilized in the criminal act, and (4) the extent to
which the general enforcement of the particular law depends upon the
seizure of private papers.
A. The Extent of the Intrusion into the Suspect's Privacy
"Papers" is a broad concept. It is defined not merely by the physi-
150. Id.
151. Id. at 386-87 (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 387. This argument seems particularly questionable. The materials
were seized because they were communicative. As one court put it, "[w]hat is 'tes-
timonial' is more seemingly meaningful than it turns out to be on analysis, for the
most impersonal of things have their own condemnatory eloquence." United States
v. Quick, 336 F. Supp. 744, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). If the theory is that records are not
communicative because they are intra-personal rather than interpersonal in char-
acter, absurd results would follow. For instance, letters would not be subject to
seizure but personal diaries would be. Courts which believe that some communica-
tive materials ought to be subject to seizure should make their reasoning explicit. It is
not surprising that Blank did not attempt to define "communicative" since other
courts employing similar arguments have also failed to do so. See United States v.
Main, 312 F. Supp. 736, 740-42 (D. Del. 1970).
153. 459 F.2d at 387.
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cal or chemical properties of an item, but rather by the presence of sym-
bolic communication, whether verbal or non-verbal. 154  In this sense
"papers" includes items as diverse as diaries, letters, address books,
business cards, betting slips, cancelled checks, insurance policies, driv-
ers' licenses, draft cards and drawings. Any attempt to classify such
materials into categories could never provide an exact index of privacy
concerns since individuals single out very different aspects of their
lives as uniquely their own.'5 5 While some people's politics or religious
tenets are well guarded aspects of anonymity, others publicly adver-
tise their deepest beliefs. Some people zealously safeguard details
of their economic life, educational background, military record, age
or physical health; others publish books about their lives of crime
or their sexual experiences. The mere fact that some citizens con-
sider their personal beliefs and activities to be the appropriate subject
of public debate in no way suggests that the government has the right
to gather similar information from the reticent majority. However, al-
though many citizens desire the broadest scope of privacy, the powers
accorded to the Census Bureau'
5 6 and the Internal Revenue Service,-
57
the compulsory process of courts' 58 and legislatures, 5 9 and the wide
latitude afforded the mass media' 60 demonstrate that privacy is not an
absolute in twentieth century America.
Without attempting to set up categories of papers which may or
may not be subject to seizure, it is nevertheless possible to discuss cer-
tain types of papers in terms of general privacy interests. For exam-
ple, there are some testimonial items the seizure of which affords no
serious privacy objection. Included here are papers created by the state
for identification purposes such as draft cards,""' automobile registra-
tion certificates and drivers' licenses. Similarly, governmental seizure
154. For an example of non-verbal testimonial papers see Hubert v. State, 234 A.2d
264 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967), wherein the defendant was accused in part of tying
up a woman preparatory to a sexual assault. Id. at 267. The papers involved were
tracings made by the defendant of pictures of bound and gagged women. Id. at
273-74. The evidence was suppressed because it was too prejudicial. Id. at 274.
The definition of non-verbal testimonial papers would not include most photographs
since they usually do not involve symbolic representations. There would appear,
however, to be no reason why the principles discussed in this Comment should not
apply equally to photographs.
155. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 412-15 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
157. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
158. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
159. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
160. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
161. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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of business records is difficult to attack on grounds of privacy. While
corporate secrets must admittedly be protected, the seizure of business
records discloses little of an individual's private life.
More difficult to assess are the privacy interests involved in the seiz-
ure of non-business economic records of an individual. To permit the
seizure of all cancelled checks and credit card receipts of an individual
would permit a rather thorough analysis of his total life style.'1 2  On the
other hand, the seizure of a single credit card receipt to establish that
an individual ate dinner in a particular section of a city would involve
a relatively insignificant intrusion on that individual's privacy.
The confiscation of personal letters involves a potentially serious in-
vasion of privacy. People often reveal aspects of their lives to close
friends, relatives, ministers, doctors and others that they would not
want revealed to anyone else.163 Letters sent to an individual could in-
162. Similarly, checking the return addresses of all mail sent to an individual, or
all telephone numbers dialed by an individual, could reveal much about his personal
relationships. The confiscation of several envelopes or registered mail receipts, to
establish merely that an individual resided at a particular address, would involve a
relatively insignificant privacy intrusion. Note that cases before Katz had concluded
that checking mail covers did not constitute a search. Lustiger v. United States,
386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Canaday v. United
States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1966).
163. The fact that the law permits informers to reveal personal confidences does
not necessarily justify the seizure of letters. If A tells B a secret, A is taking the risk
that B will violate the confidence. If B reveals the confidence, then A has lost a gam-
ble. It is one thing to accept the testimony of B or to use papers written by A to B
which are voluntarily provided by B; it is quite another to seize papers sent by A to
B without the permission of B. In one case, A has misplaced a confidence; in the
other, the state has deliberately intruded into a confidential relationship.
Indeed, it is arguable that the seizure of private letters is a more serious privacy
intrusion than the seizure of telephonic communications. The fear of wiretapping in
America is widespread. Even before police wiretapping was officially sanctioned,
free speech on the telephone was restricted-not by governmental fiat but by private
fears. It is therefore conceivable that the American people are more willing to ex-
press their private thoughts in letters than on telephones.
This is not to suggest that because people "expect" or "fear" tapping a dragnet in-
vasion of privacy is justifiable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), con-
tended that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not the subject of Fourth Amendment protection." This remark, how-
ever, appears subject to qualification. If the government announced that all future
conversations of every citizen would be tapped, the fact that no one could entertain a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" when he or she spoke on the telephone would not
prevent the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment had been recklessly ignored. The
question is not merely what expectations of privacy are reasonable, but also what
expectations of privacy should be assured. To threaten seizure of private com-
munications is to encourage a society of guarded speech, despite our "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
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volve discussions of such matters as easily as those sent by an individual.
Indeed, few items contain, the privacy interests inherent in personal
letters.
The seizure of private diaries should be even more carefully scruti-
nized. Private diaries often contain the innermost thoughts of an indi-
vidual, reflecting aspects of his personality which he is unwilling to
communicate to anyone, even his closest friends and relatives. In-
deed, often no one but the person keeping the diary ever sees its con-
tents. The seizure of such an item would be a serious invasion of pri-
vacy.
Thus, the term "papers" should not be a talisman in judging the pri-
vacy consequences of any particular search and seizure. Nor can the
concern for the protection of privacy be limited to the nature of the
object seized. The search for the object may itself intrude unduly into
private matters. If a search for an invoice involves a search of all of a
person's papers, the person's privacy is significantly compromised. Un-
fortunately, the application of the "plain view" doctrine to private pa-
pers tends to encourage such exploratory searches. In State v. Hawk-
ins,164 for example, police obtained a warrant to seize instruments and
drugs used in performing abortions.'65 They opened a diary, purport-
edly to see if it was hollowed out to contain drugs.' 16  The diary "hap-
pened" to open to a page which contained the statement "Doctor Jack
hibited, robust and wide-open ...... New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964).
Note, however, that First Amendment analysis in this area normally has little utility.
For instance, the application of First Amendment principles could lead to the absurd
conclusion that diaries could be seized while letters could not, because of the "chilling
effect" the seizure of letters would have on communication between individuals.
Nevertheless, the First Amendment is implicated in the seizure of some types of
papers. For example, when obscene literature is the object of a search and seizure
the Court requires "higher standards of particularity in the warrant than are necessary
in ordinary contraband cases, in order 'to avoid suppression of constitutionally pro-
tected publications."' T. TAYLOR, Two STuDis IN CoNsTrruTioNAL INTIRPRETAMoNS
66 (1969), quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961). Taylor
further argues that the First Amendment should "apply even more strongly to per-
sonal 'speaking documents' of the victim of the search." It is unclear, however, why
this should be the case. If the "speaking documents" were intended for publication,
such an argument might be acceptable. Most private papers, though, are intended to
remain private and are not designed for publication. Thus, privacy concerns appear
more germane to test the seizure of such papers than any peripheral First Amendment
interests. Ordinarily, therefore, only the Fourth Amendment will be involved.
164. 463 P.2d 858 (Ore. 1970).
165. Id. at 859.
166. Id.
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(and I help) gave Dawn an AB at my hse."'167 The seizure was up-
held on the principle that evidence discovered in plain view is seiz-
able. 1 8  Another example is People v. Sirhan,6 9 in which a police-
man, while throwing away a piece of paper at Sirhan's residence, "inad-
yertently" discovered an incriminating paper at the top of the trash
bin.'7 0  Once again plain view principles reigned. 17 1 Although it is
possible that the officers' stories in these cases were true, it is also
demonstrable that imaginative stories are often told in court following
exploratory rummaging through an accused's private effects. What-
ever the deficiencies of the plain view doctrine as applied to non-docu-
mentary items, its application to papers would appear to encourage con-
tinued exploratory searches through private papers.Y One means
of guaranteeing that private papers will remain private is to limit the in-
centive for such searches by denying admittance to papers found in
plain view.' 7 ' Such a limitation would not seriously hamper honest
law enforcement since, even though a paper may be in "plain view,"
its contents ordinarily cannot be ascertained without close scrutiny.' 74
B. The Gravity of the Offense
Privacy is not an absolute and in certain circumstances the objectives
of law enforcement may outweigh privacy interests. The balance must
depend in part upon the seriousness of the societal interest involved.
Surely there is a valid distinction between society's interest in obtain-
ing evidence relating to a conspiracy to assassinate the President of
167. Id.
168. Id. The court did suppress evidence garnered by reading of a second diary.
169. 7 Cal. 3d 369, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
170. Id. at 400, 497 P.2d at 1142, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
171. Id. at 400-03, 497 P.2d at 1142-44, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 406-08. The defense
neglected to raise the argument concerning the testimonial character of the paper and
the court explicitly did not consider the issue. Id. at 403, 497 P.2d at 1144, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 408.
172. "Every lawyer practicing in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is
commonplace." Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION 596-97 (May 8, 1967);
see Chevigny, Police Abuses in Connection With the Law of Search and Seizure,
5 CRim. L. BULL. 3, 8-11 (1969).
173. United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930). As the Court of
Appeals of New York observed in People v. Baker, 244 N.E.2d 232, 238 (N.Y. 1968),
"[niow that the seizure of 'mere evidence' is authorized, courts will have to be more
diligent in assuring that an authorized search for a particular item is not used as a
device to gain access for general exploratory searches for evidence, thereby destroying
the people's security in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment."
174. See notes 140 supra and 196 infra.
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the United States' 75 and its interest in obtaining evidence concerning a
simple trespass.'17  The more serious the nature of the offense, the more
extensive the invasion of privacy which ought to be permitted.
Just as it is possible to evaluate the extent of intrusion into privacy
caused by the seizure of various papers, it is possible to make judgments
concerning the relative gravity of various offenses. In Dorman v. United
States, 77 for example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, when discussing the exigent circumstances which would jus-
tify warrantless searches, noted that such searches normally will be al-
lowed more frequently where "a grave offense is involved, particularly
one that is a crime of violence. . . Contrariwise the restrictive re-
quirement for a warrant is more likely to be retained. . . when the of-
fense is what has been sometimes referred to as one of the 'compla-
cent' crimes, like gambling."' 78  Further, the gravity of the offense is
taken into consideration whenever a defendant is sentenced for a
crime. 7 Any decision regarding seizure of private papers which
fails to take the gravity of the offense into account 80 will either give
too much or too little weight to the values of privacy and order.
C. The Extent to which the Papers are
Utilized in the Criminal Act
Some criminal offenses intimately involve the use of papers.
Bank robbers, for example, often use notes to communicate with the
175. If the assassination actually occurs, it would seem that the need to read a diary
to locate possible co-conspirators would present a stronger claim for seizure than a desire
to read a diary merely to obtain evidence of premeditation. Cf. People v. Carter, 26
Cal. App. 3d 862, 872, 103 Cal. Rptr. 327, 333-34 (1972) (officers in "hot pursuit"
could seize notebook which might lead to suspect). It might also be argued that the
diary could be seized to prevent serious bodily injury but not for use in evidence.
176. One would have to entertain an unusual lack of concern for privacy to per-
mit a seizure of a personal diary to demonstrate than an accused did in fact trespass
by walking across the grass on state property.
177. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
178. Id. at 392 (citations and footnote omitted).
179. W. IAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 25 (1972).
180. Of course, such an analysis does not require a uniquely calibrated measuring
device for determining the seriousness of a criminal offense. As LaFave puts it,
"[tihere is one case-by-case variable-the seriousness of the offense-which cannot
be ignored by police and courts. Taking into account the seriousness of the offense
does not require the use of some fine-spun theory whereby each offense in the criminal
code has its own probable-cause standard; rather, it involves only the common-sense
notion that murder, rape, armed robbery, and the like call for a somewhat different
police response than, say, gambling, prostitution, or possession of narcotics." LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MiCH.
L. REv. 40, 57 (1968) (footnote omitted).
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teller in order to avoid conversation. Fraud is often committed through
the use of written materials. Agreements in criminal conspiracies are
sometimes achieved entirely through exchanges of letters. It would be
peculiar indeed to allow an accused to claim that a paper which was a
substantial tool in the commission of a crime could not be seized. A
better view would be to hold that an accused who uses a paper as a
substantial means in the commission of a criminal offense exposes
himself to potentially serious intrusions on his privacy.
It might be objected that considering the degree of involvement of the
papers in the offense is a return to the means and instrumentalities
classification.'"' Two major distinctions, however, should be noted.
First, unlike the means and instrumentalities exception, the suggested
analysis does not render such papers automatically seizable. Rather,
it assumes that the extent of utilization of the papers is merely one
factor to be weighed in making a final determination regarding seizure.
Second, this analysis would not use classifications such as mere evi-
dence or means and instrumentalities. Such arbitrary categories trans-
form differences of degree into differences of kind and impede the
formulation of logical policy standards. The suggested analysis merely
recognizes that the greater the utilization of the materials in a criminal
act, the stronger the case for seizure.
D. The Extent to Which the General Enforcement of the
Particular Law Depends Upon the Seizure of Private Papers
Warden required that there exist "a nexus . . .between the items to
be seized and criminal behavior."' 2  That link could be merely evi-
dentiary and the materials need not have been substantially involved
in the commission of the crime.1' 3 Some criminal statutes would be
almost impossible to enforce if papers of evidentiary value were not
subject to seizure. For example, it has been argued that the successful
enforcement of tax laws depends upon the ability of the government
to seize the economic records of private individuals, 8 4 even though such
records could not realistically be viewed as a substantial means of com-
mitting the offense of tax evasion. Similarly, if certain types of fraud,
conspiracy, or gambling can be achieved solely through the use of
written communications, a prohibition against the seizure of such com-
181. See text accompanying notes 35-48 supra.
182. 387 U.S. at 307.
183. See text accompanying notes 51-75 supra.
184. Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Search Warrants to Obtain Tax
Records, 6 GA. L. Rnv. 399 (1972). But cf. Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to
Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1 (1966).
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munications would be a long step toward condoning such conduct.
On the other hand, there appears to be no crime which as a general
rule requires the admission of a diary in order to achieve a successful
prosecution. It is thus clear that if exclusion of a class of materials
could significantly hamper the enforcement of an individual crime, the
case for allowing seizure would become quite compelling. A finding
to the contrary would overrule substantive laws through rules of evi-
dence, and such constructions are hardly favored, unless absolutely re-
quired by the Constitution.
VI. COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION: AN
IRRELEVANT POLICY ARGUMENT
There are those who suggest that self-incrimination should be iden-
tified as an important if not decisive factor in the formulation of stand-
ards relating to the seizure of private papers. 185 To the contrary, how-
ever, self-incrimination is not a decisive or independent factor in this
analysis, and, in fact, it appears to be an irrelevant policy consideration
that only confuses the real issue.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[tihe right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures shall not be violated .... ,,18 It does not
say that the seizure of papers is inherently unreasonable, and the unmis-
takable implication is that some papers can be the subject of a lawful
search and seizure. This is true notwithstanding Justice Bradley's rea-
soning in Boyd suggesting that the search and seizure of an invoice not
written by the accused would violate the Fourth Amendment because of
the policies of the Fifth Amendment."8" It is difficult to understand
why such an invoice should be considered more self-incriminating
than any other object, and certainly the privacy interests involved in
such an invoice are insubstantial. It would require a considerable
stretching of the Fifth Amendment to hold that no paper can ever be
the subject of a search and seizure, contrary to the clear implication in
the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the two amendments must be har-
monized.
The Fifth Amendment appears to be centrally concerned with the
production of compelled testimony. It guarantees to each individual
the right to refuse to personally produce any evidence which might in-
185. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
186. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
187. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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criminate him.'88 When a search is made for self-incriminatory arti-
cles, however, the compulsion is not to produce testimony, but to per-
mit a search for evidence already available. A search to find self-
incriminating articles does not command the accused to produce any-
thing; it compels him to stand aside while the police gather evidence.
There is an important difference between compelling an accused to per-
mit the police to search his house to find a blackmail note, and com-
pelling an accused to tell where it is. This is why the actual holding of
Boyd is still thoroughly defensible. 8 9  The Fifth Amendment simply
guarantees that no one can be compelled to produce any evidence which
might incriminate him; it matters little whether the evidence is an in-
voice, a knife, a radio or a diary.
If the police seized lottery tickets written in the handwriting of the
accused or identification forged by the accused, few would seriously
argue that the Fifth Amendment prohibited such seizure. 90 This is
true despite the fact that the accused created the items himself. When
a diary is seized, however, one is tempted to speak of self-incrimina-
tion.' 9' The diary is not different in kind from the lottery tickets; the
difference is simply one of degree. Both items are writings created by
188. Cf. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 n.6 (1973) (holding that the
compulsion of voice exemplars presented "no hint of testimonial compulsion," since the
defendant was merely displaying generally observable physical characteristics for iden-
tification purposes).
189. See text accompanying notes 8-27 supra.
190. And yet notice that such tickets would be testimonial. Unlike blood samples
(Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)), handwriting exemplars (Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)), or voice exemplars (United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973)), lottery tickets
are seized precisely for their "communicative content." The chemical and/or
physical properties of the lottery ticket are utterly irrelevant to theid value
as evidence. They are valuable precisely because the "content" of the papers
demonstrates that the accused was involved in crime. The Court faces three
choices: (1) it may deny that the Fifth Amendment is related to search ind
seizure situations; (2) it may deny that the material is testimonial; or (3) it
may emphasize the privacy aspects of the Fifth Amendment in search and
seizure situations. It should be clear that the Court is moving to create a Fifth
Amendment right to privacy. See text accompanying notes 94-111 supra. Such an
approach appears to be superfluous since the Fourth Amendment's ban against "un-
reasonable" searches and its concern for privacy (see text accompanying note 63
supra) is all that is necessary. Furthermore, if protection against the seizure of
private communications is thought to depend upon principles of self-incrimination,
the papers of concededly innocent third parties would receive less constitutional pro-
tection than the papers of a suspect. Surely the diaries of the innocent deserve as
much constitutional protection as the diaries of the accused.
191. See, e.g., People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 369, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1972).
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the accused; the crucial difference is found in the privacy interests in-
volved. At the very best, then, the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment are relevant only to the extent that they create pri-
vacy rights. This is the reason the Sixth Circuit spoke of the Fifth
Amendment right of privacy'92 and the Second Circuit suggested that
"an approach geared to the objective of the Fourth Amendment to se-
cure privacy would seem more promising than one based on the testi-
monial character of what is seized."'1 93  This is the approach taken
most recently by the Supreme Court in Couch v. United States,94 wherein
the Court noted that the petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim did
"not appear to be independent of her Fifth Amendment argument."'19 5
CONCLUSION
The law surrounding the search and seizure of private papers is in a
state of flux. Currently the Supreme Court is permitting the lower
courts to resolve the problems on a case by case basis. Perhaps the
only settled point which has emerged out of this confusion is that pa-
pers which are totally unrelated to an offense may not be seized. It is
apparent that a generally applicable standard must be developed re-
garding this important issue. It is therefore proposed that the search
and seizure of private papers should be regulated by privacy consider-
ations rather than by any self-incrimination concepts. The constitu-
tional bases for such privacy concerns are found in the particularity 98
192. 459 F.2d at 386.
193. 409 F.2d at 896. For similar discussions of the scope of Fifth Amendment
protection, see 8 1. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (MeNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Com-
ment, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dimensions of an Intimate Relationship,
13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 857 (1966); T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 59-63 (1969). Taylor presents a vigorous argument which demon-
strates clearly that Fifth Amendment protections are not violated by the seizure of
"mere evidence" (id.), but curiously concludes that, although compelling testimony
is not exactly the same as seizing letters and diaries (which papers he terms
"self-identifying"), it comes "perilously close" and thus Fifth Amendment values
should be given "primary consideration." Id. at 66. One is thus reminded "of Julia
who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent"--consented."'
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1946) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
194. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
195. Id. at 325-26 n.6. Boyd analyzed the amendments as running together in their
concern for self-incrimination. Couch analyzes them as running together in their
concern for privacy.
196. The particularity requirement alone could be used to preserve the privacy of
papers. If a court believed that diaries should not be subject to seizure, it could re-
quire that the police describe in the most particular detail the content and language
contained in the diary. If the police were able to do so, the seizure of the diary would
involve no serious intrusion of privacy since its contents would already, be known.
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and probable cause 197 requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the
Fourth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment right of privacy.0 8 It
is further suggested that particular decisions regarding the search and
seizure of private papers should be reached by balancing four factors:
(1) the extent of the intrusion into the suspect's privacy, (2) the grav-
ity of the offense, (3) the extent to which the papers are utilized in the
criminal act, and (4) the extent to which the general enforcement of the
particular law depends upon the seizure of private papers.
While individuals might balance these factors differently, a few illus-
trations as to how they could be applied should be instructive. Diaries,
for instance, give rise to important privacy interests, are not a substan-
tial means of committing any offense, and need not be seized for the
general enforcement of any particular law. Their seizure in whole or
part should not be countenanced unless the contents sought to be
seized can be described with such particularity that it is clear that pri-
vacy interests have already been compromised. Perhaps diaries should
also be seizable when a showing can be made that seizure would of-
fer a real potential of preventing serious bodily injury or death.
Private letters also involve significant privacy interests and should
not be subject to seizure except in situations where they are a substan-
tial means of committing the offense or are necessary for the general
enforcement of a particular law, such as conspiracy. The seizure of
gambling records, on the other hand, compromises no significant pri-
vacy values. Although gambling offenses are not ordinarily considered
to be serious crimes, gambling records are heavily involved in the com-
mission of the offense and prohibiting the seizure of such records would
seriously undermine the enforcement of existing law.
The considerations involved in the seizure of private papers for tax
prosecutions are more complex. The seizure of all of an individual's
economic records would involve a substantial intrusion, the particular
offense might or might not be a serious violation of the tax laws, and
the records might or might not have been used to prepare the tax forms.
Since the Internal Revenue Service was able to effectively enforce the
law prior to Warden without seizing tax records, 199 presumably the
The decision as to how much detail should be provided should be guided by the
factors discussed in this Comment.
197. See note 32 supra.
198. See note 110 supra.
199. See Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Search Warrants to Obtain Tax
Records, 6 GA. L. REv. 399 (1972).
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search and seizure of tax records is not necessary for the general en-
forcement of tax laws and therefore should not ordinarily be permit-
ted.
Even if the balancing of the relevant four factors should suggest that
certain papers could be considered constitutionally permissible objects of
seizure, it would still be necessary to determine if the search for the
material would require an impermissibly broad search through other pa-
pers. In short, courts would still have to decide if the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment had been satisfied.
Whether the courts are trying to determine the permissibility of a
seizure or the allowable scope of a search, they should begin to approach
these questions with the recognition that each one of the four factors
must be considered before an appropriate balance can be struck in
Fourth Amendment law.
Steven H. Shiffrin
